MarkTechPost ★ 96 5 min

Aikido Security Releases Altar-1: An Open-Weight Security Model Pruned From GLM-5.3 to 328 GB

AI InfrastructureFor DevsLanguage ModelOpen SourceSecuritySoftware EngineeringUncategorized

🔗 https://www.marktechpost.com/2026/09/25/aikido-security-releases-altar-1-an-open-weight-security-model-pruned-from-glm-5-3-to-328-gb/

📌 Altar-1:把 753B 資安模型塞進客戶自己的機房

TL;DR:Aikido 剪枝 GLM-5.3 到 328GB 開權重資安模型,讓滲透測試不再需要把原始碼送出網外。

當你的滲透測試工具本身就要求你把原始碼、架構文件和尚未修復的漏洞細節傳給雲端 API,這個工具的存在意義就先打了折扣。Aikido Security 這次直接把問題砍在源頭。

🤔 封閉模型解決不了資料落地問題

Aikido Security 發布首個開權重(open-weight)資安模型 Altar-1,它是 Z.AI GLM-5.3 的壓縮版本,用來驅動 Aikido Machine,一套為地端與air-gapped(實體隔離)網路設計的自主滲透測試設備。封閉的前沿模型跑在別人的基礎設施上,使用它就等於把原始碼、架構文件與尚未修復的發現送出網路邊界。Aikido 舉出受資料落地(data-residency)規範約束的銀行、以及沒有網路連線的 OT(作業技術)業者作為典型場景。開權重模型能解決落地問題,卻帶來新的部署缺口:MoE(Mixture-of-Experts)模型即使每次只用少數專家,仍必須把所有專家都存進記憶體;而資安 agent 又會建立長時間執行的上下文,KV cache 會跟模型權重搶同一塊 GPU 記憶體。

🧩 依領域重要性剪枝專家,路由邏輯不動

GLM-5.3 是一個 753B 參數的 MoE 模型,每個 token 在每層從 256 個專家中路由至 8 個,實際活躍參數約 40B。Aikido 執行了兩道壓縮步驟:第一步用 Aikido 滲透測試框架的實際軌跡,加上程式碼、工具呼叫、推理與多語言 Wikipedia 文字做校準(calibration),官方聲明未使用任何客戶資料。第二步為每個專家依「該專家在單一領域被路由任務中所佔的最大份額」評分,藉此保留負責程式碼、稀有語言與結構化輸出的專家不被砍掉。路由機制本身沒有改變,仍是每個 token 選 8 個專家,只是候選池從 256 縮減到 168 個,活躍參數維持約 40B。最終 Altar-1 比 BF16 原版小 78.2%,比 AWQ 版本再小 32.8%。在保真度上,於一組 25 道題的封閉測試集上,Altar-1 對完整 BF16 的 KL 散度為 0.506 nats,同一剪枝結果的 EXL3 版本則是 0.511。

📊 CVE 重現測試:召回率略降,覆蓋率幾乎不變

Aikido 團隊在內部 CVE 基準上測試 Altar-1,涵蓋 30 個程式庫中的 32 個已知漏洞,每案跑 3 次。相較 AWQ 版本,剪枝大約損失 1 個百分點的召回率,覆蓋率沒有損失;相較未壓縮的原始模型,Altar-1 在 25 個可覆蓋的漏洞中保住 23 個(92%),召回率則低了 5.2 個百分點。這個基準範圍其實不大,它只衡量在一個混用其他模型負責周邊階段的 pipeline 中,對已知 CVE 的目標式重現能力,並不測試盲目探索發現、漏洞利用驗證或修復建議產出。Aikido 另外提到 Altar-1 在一次客戶正式滲透測試中找到一個有效的重大(critical)等級漏洞,但這是廠商自行回報的單一案例。

⚠️ 硬體與授權限制

模型卡要求 Hopper 架構 GPU(H100 或 H200)。Aikido 表示在 4x H200 上的 328GB 空間,能在生產環境批次量下留出 128k context 的 KV cache 空間;vLLM 會自動選用 Marlin MoE kernel。值得注意的是,4x H100 80GB 節點只有 320GB 記憶體,小於 328GB 的模型權重,也就是放不下。授權上,Altar-1 沿用 GLM-5.3 授權,允許商業使用、修改與再散布,但年營收超過 100 億美元的 Model-as-a-Service 業者,必須先通過 Z.AI 的安全審查;Altar-1 屬於開權重,並非 OSI 認證的開源軟體。

🎯 實務啟示

Altar-1 目前也驅動 Aikido Attack、AI Code Analysis 與 Deep Review 等產品,Aikido 團隊規劃下一步嘗試 EXL3 等更低位元格式以保留更多專家,並針對資安工作流程做微調。對於必須在氣隙網路或高度受管制環境中運行安全工具的團隊而言,這種「依領域感知做專家剪枝」的做法,提供了一條在單機 4 卡 GPU 上跑起 753B 級 MoE 模型的具體路徑,但目前驗證仍侷限在已知 CVE 的重現能力上,尚未證明對零時差或未知漏洞的發現力。

🔗 來源

#OpenWeightAI #MoE #LLMPruning #AISecurity #Pentesting #GLM #vLLM #ModelCompression #CyberSecurity #AIInfra

原始資料 MarkTechPost · 收集於 2026-09-25
來源原標題
Aikido Security Releases Altar-1: An Open-Weight Security Model Pruned From GLM-5.3 to 328 GB
作者
Asif Razzaq
原始標籤
AI Infrastructure · AI Shorts · Applications · Artificial Intelligence · Editors Pick · For Devs · Language Model · New Releases · Open Source · Security · Software Engineering · Staff · Tech News · Technology · Uncategorized
原始連結
https://www.marktechpost.com/2026/09/25/aikido-security-releases-altar-1-an-open-weight-security-model-pruned-from-glm-5-3-to-328-gb/

摘要原文

Aikido Security has released Altar-1 , its first open-weight security model . It is a compressed version of Z.AI’s GLM-5.3 , built to run inside infrastructure the customer controls. Altar-1 powers Aikido Machine , the company’s autonomous pentesting appliance for on-prem and air-gapped networks. Is it deployable? Yes, the weights are public on Hugging Face and run with vLLM on a single node of 4x NVIDIA H200 GPUs. Closed frontier models run on someone else’s infrastructure. Using them sends source code, architecture docs, and unremediated findings outside the network. Aikido points to banks under data-residency mandates and OT operators with no internet route. Open-weight models solve the residency problem but create a deployment gap. Mixture-of-experts (MoE) models must store every expert, even when a workload uses only a few of them. Security agents also build long-running context. That KV cache competes with model weights for the same GPU memory. GLM-5.3 is a 753B parameter MoE model. Each token routes to 8 of 256 experts per layer, which is about 40B active parameters. Aikido applied 2 compression steps : Calibration used traces from Aikido’s pentesting harness, plus coding, tool calling, reasoning, and multilingual Wikipedia text. Aikido states no customer data was used. Each expert is scored by its largest share of any single domain’s routed work. That protects the specialist experts for code, rare languages, and structured output. Routing is unchanged. The router still picks 8 experts per token, now from 168, with about 40B active parameters. Altar-1 is 78.2% smaller than BF16 and 32.8% smaller than the AWQ parent. On fidelity, Altar-1 has a KL divergence of 0.506 nats against full BF16 on a sealed 25-prompt panel. An EXL3 build of the same cut scores 0.511. The details are in the public fidelity study . Aikido team tested Altar-1 on its internal CVE benchmark . The benchmark covers 32 known vulnerabilities across 30 repositories, with 3 runs per case. Compared with the AWQ checkpoint, pruning cost about 1 point of recall and no coverage. Compared with the parent, Altar-1 keeps 23 of 25 covered vulnerabilities (92%) at 5.2 points lower recall. The benchmark’s scope is narrow. It measures targeted CVE rediscovery inside a pipeline that uses other models for the surrounding stages. It does not measure blind discovery, exploit validation, or fix proposals. Aikido also reports that Altar-1 found a valid critical-severity vulnerability during a client’s production pentest. That is a single result reported by the vendor. The model card requires Hopper GPUs (H100 or H200). Aikido says 328 GB across 4x H200 leaves room for a 128k-context KV cache at production batch sizes. vLLM selects the Marlin MoE kernel automatically. A 4x H100 80 GB node has only 320 GB of memory, which is less than the 328 GB of weights. Altar-1 inherits the GLM-5.3 License . The license permits commercial use, modification, and redistribution. Model-as-a-Service operators with more than $10B in revenue over 12 months must first pass a Z.AI security review. Altar-1 is open-weight, not OSI-approved open source. Altar-1 also powers Aikido Attack , AI Code Analysis , and Deep Review . Next, Aikido plans to try lower-bit formats like EXL3 so it can keep more experts. It also plans to fine-tune models for security workflows. Check out the Model Weights and Technical Details . All credit goes to the researcher of this project. Also, feel free to follow us on Twitter and don’t forget to join our 150k+ML SubReddit and Subscribe to our Newsletter . Wait! are you on telegram? now you can join us on telegram as well. Need to partner with us for promoting your GitHub Repo OR Hugging Face Page OR Product Release OR Webinar etc.? Connect with us The post Aikido Security Releases Altar-1: An Open-Weight Security Model Pruned From GLM-5.3 to 328 GB appeared first on MarkTechPost .

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