Uber's CISO on building an insider threat program for AI
https://claude.com/resources/articles/uber-s-ciso-on-building-an-insider-threat-program-for-ai📌 【Claude 客戶故事】Uber CISO:AI agent 也需要「內部威脅」管理
TL;DR:Uber CISO Philip Martin 主張替 AI agent 建立如同人類員工的內部威脅計畫,並搭配 Anthropic 的 Enterprise Frontier Safeguards 落地。
🎣 每家公司都替員工建立內部威脅(insider threat)管理機制,沒有人會質疑這件事的必要性。但當「員工」換成了會自主呼叫工具、跨服務溝通的 AI agent,同樣的防護網卻幾乎不存在。這正是 Uber CISO Philip Martin 在這篇訪談中提出的核心主張。
🤔 背景:一天 4,000 萬趟行程的資安挑戰
Uber 經營全球最大的即時媒合平臺之一,每天處理超過 4,000 萬趟行程與外送訂單。Philip Martin 帶領的團隊負責保護 Uber 的資料,以及使用平臺的乘客、司機與外送員。團隊在 Claude Code 問世之前就已經在用 Claude 做威脅建模,當時還得靠人工彙整上下文;現在透過 Claude Fable,Claude 能自行從程式碼、設計文件與 ticket 歷史中蒐集上下文。
🧩 Enterprise Frontier Safeguards 與 Uber 自研 ADR 的分工
Martin 指出,Anthropic 與 Uber 在「安全」這件事上有共同的核心關注,只是場景不同:Uber 關注乘客安全與個資保護,Anthropic 則聚焦於防止前沿模型被誤用。Enterprise Frontier Safeguards 讓 Uber 能在不把資料開放給 Anthropic 存取的前提下,取得安全防護機制,並由 Uber 自行決定觸發防護後要採取的風險緩解行動。
搭配這套機制,Uber 近期開源了一款名為 AI Detection and Response(ADR)的工具,用於在 agent 執行環境(harness)中蒐集即時遙測資料並做出即時反應。Martin 形容,這讓團隊同時擁有「自己對 agent 行為的觀察視角」與「Anthropic classifier 輸出的結果」,兩者可以整合進既有的整體偵測環境,運作邏輯類似傳統資安架構。再加上控管 AI 使用邊界的 LLM gateway,三者共同構成 Uber 的整體 AI 資安架構。
💡 威脅情報的下一步:即時介入與行為模式辨識
被問到防禦者接下來該優先投入哪裡時,Martin 提出兩個重點:第一是即時偵測與介入,盡可能在使用者於 harness 中輸入 prompt 的當下,就提示「這個工具呼叫、這個連線目的地可能不是你想要的」;第二是理解新出現的行為模式——團隊觀察模型行為趨勢,(部分藉助 LLM 輔助)發現過去未知的行為,並把對應的防護機制回饋進即時平臺,而新的限制又會催生新的行為,形成持續循環。
他也提到一個值得關注的願景:未來每個服務都可能搭配一個深度理解該服務的 agent,這些 agent 之間能像生產環境中的服務一樣互相溝通威脅模型資訊,進一步放大團隊協作效益。
🎯 實務啟示
對導入 agentic AI 的企業資安團隊而言,這篇訪談傳遞的訊息很明確:不要把 AI agent 的風險管理視為獨立於既有安全框架之外的新問題,而是把「員工內部威脅計畫」的思路延伸過去——包含資料留存、行為監控、即時介入等機制,都需要有對應的 AI 版本。Uber 將自研的 ADR 與供應商提供的 Enterprise Frontier Safeguards 並行使用,是一個可供參考的分層防護架構。
🔗 來源
- 標題:Uber’s CISO on building an insider threat program for AI
- 作者/機構:Anthropic
- 連結:https://claude.com/resources/articles/uber-s-ciso-on-building-an-insider-threat-program-for-ai
#AISecurity #InsiderThreat #Anthropic #Claude #Uber #CISO #EnterpriseAI #AgenticAI #AIRiskManagement #CyberSecurity
原始資料 Claude Blog · 收集於 2026-10-13
摘要原文
Uber runs one of the world's largest real-time marketplaces, with over 40 million trips and delivery orders a day. Philip Martin, Uber's Chief Information Security Officer (CISO), leads the team that protects Uber's data and the riders, drivers, and couriers who use the platform in the real world. His team started working with Claude on threat modeling before Claude Code existed, assembling context by hand. Now, with Claude Fable, Claude gathers that context itself from code, design docs, and ticket history. Martin thinks AI agents need the same kind of insider threat program companies already run for their employees. We spoke with him about that idea, why he thinks so much about accidental misuse, and how Uber's open-source monitoring tools work alongside Enterprise Frontier Safeguards. How are frontier models changing your security team’s work? The really big difference between prior models and today’s frontier models is their ability to incorporate additional context over long time horizons, and as a result, generate really specific outputs. When we're doing security reviews or threat modeling for a given service application, we can let the models consume a lot more context about the service, whether that's the code itself, design documents, issues in Jira, or historical context on what the service is supposed to do and what it interacts with. I see the same thing emerging with teams of agents. I can imagine a world in the not-too-distant future where each service has an agent associated with it that understands that service very well, and those agents can talk to each other, the same way the services might in production, about the threat model: this is my threat model, this is where my data comes from. That team-of-agents effect will take us to the next level of efficacy. Uber worked with our team Enterprise Frontier Safeguards. Why was this important for Uber? One thing Anthropic and Uber have in common is a bone-deep focus on safety, albeit in very different contexts. When Uber thinks about safety, we think about rider safety, protecting personal data. Anthropic wants to prevent the misuse of its frontier models, but Uber needs to protect our customer data, our trade secrets, and any other proprietary information. Enterprise Frontier Safeguards allow us to strike this balance: the safeguards are in place, but our data is not accessible to Anthropic without our permission. It gives us control of our data and control of the risk mitigation and the actions we decide to take after a safeguard is triggered. I think we share a responsibility to make sure these models are used safely and effectively in the world. When your team walked us through the design, it was clear that you heard our feedback. You put us in the driver's seat. This allows us to protect our data while still being responsible stewards of the capabilities of these models. How Enterprise Frontier Safeguards fit with the safety monitoring you already run on AI deployments Uber? We've done a ton of work since the very beginning on how we deploy AI safely within Uber. We recently open-sourced a product called AI Detection and Response (ADR) (opens in new tab) , designed to gather real-time telemetry and take real-time action in the agent harnesses we deploy. It complements Anthropic's safeguards, because we now have access to enhanced data to detect when an agent is acting outside its bounds and respond in real time. We have our own view of what's going on, plus output from Anthropic's classifier, and we can integrate both into our overall detection environment, much like a traditional cybersecurity one. It's all about assembling context effectively to reach a decision as fast, and with as much certainty, as possible. I think we'll see Enterprise Frontier Safeguards feed into ADR as a data source. Together with our LLM gateway, which builds a perimeter and controls how AI is used within Uber, those make up our overall AI security architecture. Where do you think defenders should prioritize their focus next when it comes to securing AI systems? Number one is real-time detection and intervention: getting as close as we can to the human entering a prompt in a harness, to be able to tell them, "You probably don't want to do that," or "The tool this model is about to call, the place it's about to connect to, is probably not something you want to happen." Number two is better understanding emerging patterns. We look at trends in model behavior and detect new behaviors we didn't know were possible. That becomes a cycle. We look at the data, in many cases with the assistance of LLMs, discover these behaviors as they appear, and build safeguards against them back into the real-time platform. Then new behaviors emerge, because constraints create new behaviors, and we find those too. What would you tell other leaders who are hesitant about the monitoring frontier models require? AI adoption is a business imperative. It's coming whether we want it or not, and it's going to bring real benefits to businesses and people around the world. But there's also real potential for harm, and the stakes rise as models get more capable and take on more complex, autonomous work. Every company already runs an insider threat program for its people. Nobody argues about that. We accept the sometimes onerous data retention, and we monitor things we'd rather not monitor, because we know humans occasionally act outside the bounds of their role, for any number of reasons. Frontier models introduce the same risk. These models may be directed to act outside the constraints we expect them to operate within. So we need the equivalent capability for AI. That insider threat program for models is going to be essential to rolling these systems out safely and securely. Learn more about Enterprise Frontier Safeguards (opens in new tab) .
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